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REFORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Gilbert H. Montague*

O

N January 22, 1941, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, appointed to investigate the need for
procedural reform in various federal administrative tribunals and to
suggest improvements therein, submitted its final report and a proposed bill to Attorney General Jackson,1 who on January 24, 1941,

* Member of the New York Bar; A.B., A.M., LL.B., Harvard; author, Business
Competition and the Law (1917); Co-author, Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation (1917 and Supp. 1931); Business Cycles t1nd
Unemployment (1923).-Ed.
1 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Report of the Committee
on Administrative Procedure, appointed by the Attorney General, at the request of
the President, to investigate the need for procedural reform in various administrative
tribunals and to suggest improvements therein: submitted Jan. 22, 1941 to Attorney
General Robert H. Jackson, and transmitted by him on Jan. 24, 1941 to Senate:
Senate Document No. 8, 77th Congress, 1st Session; hereinafter cited as "Report."
The committee as designated on Feb. 23, 1939 consisted of James W. Morris, chairman, then an Assistant Attorney General and now a Justice of the District Court of
United States for the District of Columbia; D. Lawrence Groner, then and now
Chief Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; Carl
McFarland, then and now a practicing lawyer in Washington, D.C. and formerly an
Assistant Attorney General; Golden W. Bell, then Assistant Solicitor General; Arthur
T. Vanderbilt, then and now a practicing lawyer in Newark, N.J. and formerly President of the American Bar Association; Dean Acheson, then a practicing lawyer in
Washington, D.C. and formerly Under Secretary of the Treasury and now Assistant
Secretary of State. REPORT 252-253. On March 15, 1939 the Attorney General enlarged the Committee by adding Robert H. Jackson, then Solicitor General and later
Attorney General and now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States; Henry M. Hart, Jr., then and now Professor of Law, Harvard Law School,
and formerly Assistant Attorney General; Harry Shulman, then and now Professor of
Law, Yale Law School; Lloyd K. Garrison, then and now Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School and formerly Chairman of National Labor Relations Board; Ralph F.
Fuchs, then and now Professor of Law, Washington University Law School, St. Louis;
and E. Blythe Stason, then and now Dean, University of Michigan Law School.
REPORT 253. Mr. Bell later withdrew from the Committee, and Mr. Jackson also
withdrew when he became Attorney General, and was replaced by Francis Biddle, then
Solicitor General, and now Attorney General, and formerly Circuit Judge of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. After Mr. Morris became a United
States District Justice he withdrew as chairman of the committee but continued to be a
member, and Mr. Acheson became chairman. The committee's report is signed by

502

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

transmitted these to the Senate with his recommendation that the proposed bill receive favorable consideration.2 Every member of the
committee approved this report and this proposed bill,3 but the approval
of four members of the committee was subject to their additional views
and recommendations, expressed in statements and in a di:ffering proposed bill.4 Pending now before the Senate are S. 674 embodying the
proposed bill favored by the minority of the committee, and S. 67 5
embodying the proposed bill favored by the majority of the committee,
and S. 9 I 8 embodying certain features of these bills and also of the
Logan-Walter Bill 5 which President Roosevelt vetoed on December
I 8, 1940.6 The conflicting views embodied in these bills and in the
committee's report and in the additional views and recommendations of
the minority of the committee have been extensively discussed in the
law periodicals 7 and in hearings from April to July 1941 before a
every member of the committee as thus changed, and also by Professor Walter Gellhorn,
whom the committee employed as director of its investigating staff.
2 REPORT iii.
3 REPORT iv.
-! REPORT iv, 203-250. Additional views and recommendations were submitted
by Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt, REPORT 203-247, who are hereinafter
called the minority of the committee, although additional views and recommendations
going somewhat· further than those of Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt were
submitted by Chief Justice Groner. REPORT 248-250.
5 H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d sess., "An Act to Provide for the Expeditious
Settlement of Disputes with the United States, and for Other Purposes."
6 Message from the President of the United States, Dec. 18, 1940, H. Doc.
986, 76th Cong., 3d sess.
7 "Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure--Majority and
Minority Reports," 27 A.B.A.J. 91 (1941); Editorial, "Great Issues as to Administrative Procedures," id. 95; Administrative Law Symposium, id. 133-153, 207-218
{by Pound, Acheson and McGuire); Biddle, "Administrative Procedure Legislation,"
id. 660; Pound, "For the Minority Report," id. 664; Editorial, "A Classic Discussion
of Administrative Law," id. 686; Justice Frankfurter, "Foreword," 41 CoL. L. REv.
585 (1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," id. 589
( I 941) ; Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
id. 617 (1941); Davison, "Administrative Technique--The Report on Administrative
Procedure," id. 628 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1941); Hart,
"The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 lowA L. REv. 801 (1941); Nathanson,
"Separation of Functions within Federal Administrative Agencies: A Comment on
the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 35
ILL. L. REv. 901 (1941); Fuchs, "Some Aspects and Implications of the Report of
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 7 OHio ST. L. J. 342
(1941); Horack, "Administrative Procedure: A Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH.
UNIV. L. Q. 492 (1941); Prettyman, "Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure," 8 J. B. A. DIST. CoL. 231 (1941); Jennings, "Final
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 19 TEX.
L. REV. 436 (1941); "Administrative Reform: The Report of the Attorney General's
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subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 8 The American Bar
Association through its House of Delegates has endorsed S. 674.0
Debate on administrative procedure is today proceeding with somewhat more light and less heat than previously,10 and credit for this
belongs to both the majority and the minority of the Attorney General's
Committee.
Committee and Proposed Legislation," 9 INT. JuR. AssN. Mo. BuLL. 133 (1941);
64 N. J. L. J. 45 (1941); Miller, "Report of Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure with Respect to the Interstate Commerce Commission,"
8 I. C. C. Pract. J. 503 (1941); Hart, "Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 35 AM. PoL, Sci. REv. 501 (1941). See also
GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, passim (1941); CARR, CoNCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 94 (1941); PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND
THE RULE OF LAw 79, 85, 91, 228, 232, (1941).
8 "Administrative Procedure," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong. 1st sess. on S. 674, A Bill to Prescribe Fair Standards
of Duty and Procedure of Administrative Officers and Agencies, To Establish an
Administrative Code, and for Other Purposes, S. 675, A Bill to Revise the Administrative Procedure of Federal Agencies; to Establish the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure; to Provide for Hearing Commissioners; to Authorize Declaratory
Rulings by Administrative Agencies; and for Other Purposes, and S. 918, A Bill to
Provide for the More Economical, Expeditious, and Just Settlement of Dispute with
the United States, and for Other Purposes, April 2 to July 2, 1941, Parts 1-4, hereinafter cited as "HEARINGS."
9 HEARINGS 918-919.
10 Previous to the Attorney General's Committee's Report, name-calling reached
a high pitch. Critics of existing administrative methods were accused of trying to
destroy administrative agencies in order to thwart the legislative reforms for which
Congress created these agencies. See Message from the President of the United
States, Dec. 18, 1940, H. Doc. 986, 76th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 2, 3. See also LANms,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123 (1938); Landis, "Crucial Issues in Administrative
Law," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1077 at 1078, 1089-1090 (1940). Defenders of the
administrative method were accused of trying to subvert fundamental requirements of
fair play and due process in order to erect an administrative absolutism. See Report
of Special Committee on Administrative Law of American Bar Association, Pound,
Chairman, 63 A. B. A. REP. 331 et seq. (1938); Pound, "The Place of the Judiciary
in a Democratic Polity," 27 A. B. A. ]. 133 (1941). The complete absence of namecalling in the report of the Attorney General's Committee and in the minority's "Additional Views and Recommendations" and the tolerance and mutual respect with which
the majority and minority there discussed their differences have set the fashion for a
complete elimination of name-calling. But the old habit is dying hard. See Shulman,
HEARINGS 838-839, 848-849, 857; Pound, HEARINGS 1579-1584; Pound, "The Place
of the Judiciary in a Democratic Polity," 27 A. B. A. J. 133 (1941); Pound, "For
the Minority Report," id. 664 at 667-668 ( 1941); Frankfurter, "Foreword," 41 CoL.
L. REV. 585 (1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," id.
589 at 600; Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 408 (1941); Hart, "The Acheson
Report: A Critique," 26 lowA L. REV. 804 at 805, 813-814, 818 (1941); Horack,
"Administrative Procedure: A Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH. UNiv. L. Q.
492 at 507 (1941).
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No longer can it be doubted that administrative agencies are necessary. No longer can it be assumed that all administrative agencies can
be run into the same mold as regards adjudicating, rule-making and
judicial review. These points the Attorney General's Committee has
removed from debate, by simply describing in its monographs and its
report the developments and characteristics of twenty-seven typical
agencies.11 Quickly the committee has put into focus the chief issues
that are still debatable: How far should administrative duties be delegated to subordinates? How far should adjudicating functions be
separated from other administrative activities? How far should hearing commissioners be independent of the administrative agencies? How
far should administrative rule-making be safeguarded, and how far
should rule-making and declaratory ruling procedure be extended?
How far should the courts review administrative action? Should Congress prescribe standards of fair procedure, or should it leave the problem to the administrative agencies and to the new proposed Office of
Administrative Procedure, or should Congress legislate specifically for
specific administrative agencies? The committee's monographs, for
which the committee's director and investigating staff are primarily
11 These agencies to which the Committee's studies were confined are: Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Marketing Service; Commodity Exchange Administration; Bureau of Animal Industry; Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine;
Surplus Marketing Administration; and Sugar Division), Department of Commerce
(Civil Aeronautics Administration; Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation; and
Patent Office), Department of the Interior (Bituminous Coal Division; General Land
Office; Grazing Service; Office of Indian Affairs; Bureau of Fisheries; and Bureau
of Biological Survey), Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service),
Department of Labor (Division of Public Contracts; Wage and Hour Division; and
Children's Bureau), Post Office Department (fraud orders and second-class mailing
privileges), Department of State (Passport Division, Visa Division, and the Division
of Controls, having to do with the international traffic in arms and with the supervision and administration of neutrality laws), Department of the Treasury (Bureau of
Internal Revenue, into which has been absorbed the Federal Alcohol Administration;
Processing Tax Board of Review; Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency; and the
Bureau of Customs), War Department (Office of the Chief of Engineers; the Selective
Service Act was enacted after the completion of these studies), Commodity Exchange
Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Power Commission, Federal
Reserve System, Federal Security Agency (Social Security Board, Public Health Service,
and the Food and Drug Administration), Federal Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, National Labor Relations Board, National Mediation Board,
National Railroad Adjustment Board, Railroad Retirement Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, United States Board of Tax Appeals, United States Employees'
Compensation Commission (including the deputy commissioners), United States Maritime Commission, United States Tariff Commission, and Veterans' Administration.

REPORT

3-4.
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responsible,12 are perhaps not sufficiently critical of the agencies on some
of these questions. 13 But in the committee's report all of these questions
are debated, and this debate is continued in the law periodicals and in
the Senate subcommittee hearings, and a summation now of this debate
may be helpful in shaping its future course.

I
How

FAR SHOULD ADMINISTRATIVE DuTrns BE DELEGATED
TO SuBORDINATEs?

Delegation of duties to subordinates to a very considerable extent
has been sanctioned by the committee. Duties which may be delegated
include personnel selection and management, investigation, informal
adjustment or decision, and the issuance of complaints. 14 The hearing
Vanderbilt, HEARINGS 1306-1307.
Id. See also Chief Justice Groner, HEARINGS 1362: "When the Committee was
first appointed it consisted only of six persons. Very early in its existence it was
augmented or diluted, as the case may be, by the appointment of our friend, Attorney
General Jackson, and five professors or deans of law schools. I do not think there was
anybody on the committee, or anybody with any relationship to the committee, or
with any knowledge of the personnel of the committee, that had any doubt that at
least the majority of the committee was strongly predisposed in favor of the administrative process generally, and that they were disposed to curtail, wherever, in their
opinion, it properly could be done, the active duty of the courts in matters of review."
See also Caldwell, "The Federal Communications Commission-Comments on the
Report of the Staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Law,"
8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 749 at 816 (1940); Davison, "Administrative Technique-The Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REV. 628 at 636, 644 (1941);
PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RuLE OF LAw 79, 91, 92 (1941). Views expressed in the committee's monographs cannot properly be ascribed to the committee,
for in a number of instances statements in the committee's monographs are unsupported
by or are inconsistent with the views expressed in the committee's report. The committee's director, Professor Gellhorn, in his Schouler Lectures on Federal Administrative
Proceedings at Johns Hopkins University in May 1941 cited four times the committee's
report and cited thirty times the committee's monographs. See GELLHORN, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ( I 941).
14 REPORT 52. To authorize this delegation of duties will require legislation
amending the laws governing all the agencies affected. Informal adjustment and decision, and the issuance of complaints, are sometimes as important as the final decision
of cases. See Securities and Exchange Commission (Mr. Healy), HEARINGS 315-316,
388; LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 95, 107-1II (1938); Lane, Address in
"Symposium on Administrative Law," 9 AM. L. ScH. REv. 154 at 157-161 (1939);
Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL.
L. REV. 617 at 618 (1941); Davison, "Administrative Technique--The Report on
Administrative Procedure," id. 628 at 630. Nevertheless both the majority and the
minority of the Attorney General's Committee recommend legislation amending the
laws governing all the agencies so as to authorize this delegation of duties. REPORT
193, 218. Says Mr. Dulles, "such powers as the proposed law would make delegable
12
18
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and initial decision of cases may likewise be delegated, and even a
limited review of those decisions.15 But the committee insists that the
power to review be squarely placed on specified persons, who shall
assume and exercise personal responsibility.
" ... But that review should be given by the officials charged
with the responsibility for it, and the review so given should include a personal mastery of at least the portions of the record
embraced within the exceptions.
"In agencies headed by a board, commission or authority,
further division· of labor may be necessary to provide the time for
individual attention by the agency heads. The members may
find it necessary to sit in divisions, as do the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Board of Tax Appeals, with the full board
reviewing decisions only in cases of exceptional importance or
upon petition. . ..
constitute the great bulk of administrative action; •.• in practice informal adjudications are usually decisive and final; and .•. whether or not the administrative process
is abused depends primarily upon whether such delegable powers are fairly exercised.
If the Congress is to sanction such delegation, it is desirable that the vital importance
of the delegable powers should be recognized, perhaps by some recital of Congressional
policy•••• This would be promoted, in the case of single headed agencies-but not
Commissions-by the Committee proposal that 'where the ultimate authority in any
agency is vested in a single individual, he may delegate any of his powers of final
adjudication to one or more agency tribunals with such membership as he may prescribe.' This, in effect, means that the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, or the head of any other 'single headed' agency, might, without further Congressional action, create new Commissions with power of final administrative adjudication. • • • But it would seem that the Committee proposal should be accompanied
by a provision that membership on such new Commissions should be subject to confirmation by Congress. It is well that a certain formality and public scrutiny should
attend the designation of those who are to exercise such decisive power as is contemplated by the Committee's proposed law.'' Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the
Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 617-618 (1941). Mr.
John Foster Dulles is Chairman of the Committee on Administrative Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, whose work in this field is highly commended
by Attorney General (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) Robert H. Jackson
and by President Roosevelt. See Message from the President of the United States, Dec.
18, 1940, H. Doc. 986, 76th Cong. 3d sess., pp. 4, II.
15 REPORT 52. This also will require legislation amending the laws governing all
the agencies, and is recommended by both the majority and the minority of the
Attorney General's Committee, although this delegation of duties is questioned by the
Federal Trade Commission (Mr. Wooden), HEARINGS 303-304, and by several legal
authorities. Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv.
588 at 597-604 (1941); Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure," id. 617; Davison, "Administrative Technique--The Report on
Administrative Procedure," id. 628 at 633-636; Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Proced?Ie," 8 UNiv. CH1. L. REV. 401 at
424-426 (1941).
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"In single headed departments and agencies, like the Post
Office and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture . . .
all pretense of consideration of each case by the agency head
[should] be abandoned and ... there [should] be created either
boards of review, as in immigration procedure, or chief deciding
officers who shall exercise the final power of decision. But if the
agency head in these departments does review a case, he must
assume the burden of personal decision." 16
This outstanding recommendation the committee puts forward for
the express purpose of eliminating decisions by anonymous reviewers
or memorandum writers who have not heard the evidence, but whose
summaries may strongly affect the final result. The committee believes
that there should be little greater need by administrators for review
attorneys than would exist among appellate judges.11 The concurrence
by every member of the committee and its director in these conclusions
and this recommendation may have important consequences in the
future development of the administrative process.
A strong plea for "anonymous" decision-making, on the precedent
of the Arlidge 18 decision, was unsuccessfully pressed upon the Supreme
Court by government counsel in the Morgan case.10 Law school com52-53.
52.
18 Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A. C. 120.
19 Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 at 482, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936), in
which Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court, stated: "The Government
presses upon our attention the case of Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915]
A. C. 120, reversing King v. Local Government Board, [1914] 1 K. B. 160. That
case has provoked much discussion, but we do not think it necessary to review it, as it
relates to a different sort of administrative action and is not deemed to be pertinent to
a proceeding under the statute before us and to the hearing which is required by the
principles established by our decisions." See also 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999
(1938). The Arlidge decision has long been the leading authority for the "departmental tradition" (as described by Professor Feller) of adjudicating by "institutional
consideration by a corps of officers under the general supervision of the agency head,"
as opposed to the "court tradition" of adjudicating by "personal consideration of controversies by the judge."
Professor Feller exp.lains: "in an agency the decision is the product of the cooperative effort of a number of officers with the agency head. . . . Instead of relying
upon the ability and integrity of a single judge, we rely upon the cooperative and
cumulative efforts of a number of specialized officers. • •. Because the statutes, in words,
conferred the prescribed functions on the agency head, no one was willing to admit
that in actuality they were exercised as if conferred on the department. This pretence has been .•• misleading to the public and the courts ...• It should be abandoned
once and for all. One can then either recognize frankly the ubiquity and necessity of
the departmental tradition and attempt to make it function more efficiently or one
can insist on complete segregation." Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes
lG REPORT

17 REPORT
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ment2° was at first critical of the Arlidge decision, seeing in it a recrudescence of the Star Chamber, but law school sentiment later
changed, and more recent law school comment has been enthusiastic
for the.Arlidge decision, 21 and has been critical of the Morgan decision. 22
of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv. 589 at 601-602 (1941). The essence of the "departmental
tradition" is thus "anonymous" decision-making and the commingling of adjudicating
and prosecuting functions. Naturally, partisans of the "departmental tradition" deplore
that the Attorney General's Committee has unanimously accepted "the principles of the
first two Morgan cases •.• with a heavy weighting of the scales in favor of the court
tradition." Feller, id. at 601-602. See also Feller, "Prospectus for the Future Study
of Federal Administrative Law," 47 YALE L. J. 647 at 662-664 (1938); Jaffe,
"Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1201 at 12111212 (1939); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REV. 401 at 428-430 (1941). The Arlidge decision and the "departmental tradition" are nowhere defended in the report of the
Attorney General's Committee or in the hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
20
See 28 HARV. L. REv. 198 at 199, 207 (1915).
21
Frankfurter, "The Task of Administrative Law," 75 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 614
at 615 (1927); Frankfurter, "Foreword to a Discussion of Current Developments
in Administrative Law," 47 YALE L. J. 5 l 5 at 517 (1938); Feller, "Prospectus for the
Further Study of Federal Administrative Law," id. 647 at 663 (1938); Cooper, "Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion," id. 577 at 578; Feller, "Administrative
Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv. 588 at 600-602 (1941); LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 3 (1938); Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1201 at 1208, 1211-1212 (1938); Jaffe,
"The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,"
8 UNIV. Cm. L. REV. 401 at 428-429 (1941). See also Jennings, "Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation," 49 HARv. L.
REV. 429 (1936); CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW II1-II6
( l 94 l). See also note 19 above.
22
36 CoL. L. REv. II56 (1936); 52 HARv. L. REv. 509 at 5II, 515 (1939);
Handler, "The Morgan Case and the National Labor Relations Board," C. C. H.,
LABOR LAw CoMMENTS No. 5 (1938); Gellhorn and Linfield, "Politics and Labor
Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of N.L.R.B. Procedure," 39 CoL. L. REv.
339 at 382 (1939); Landis, "Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARV. L.
REV. 1077 at 1097-1098, 1100-1101 (1940); and the Jaffe and Feller articles cited
in the preceding note. Because the principles of the Morgan cases "correspond only
partially with the actual practice of a good many administrative agencies both in this
country and in England," and because "these apparently self-evident principles were
effectively enunciated by the Supreme Court only three years ago," Professor Feller
deplores that the principles of the Morgan cases "appear to have been self-evident to
the Committee." Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age;' 41 CoL.
L. REv. 588 at 601 (1941). Professor Feller appears to ignore the Supreme Court's
long continued insistence upon "fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the
essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature." Morgan v. United States,
304 U. S. l at 19, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938). See Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U. S. 88 at 90-94, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913), unanimous
opinion by Lamar, J.; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 at 262-263, 265-266,
44 S. Ct. 317 (1924), opinion by Brandeis, J.; United States v. Abilene & So. Ry.,
265 U.S. 274 at 286-290, 44 S. Ct. 565 (1924), unanimous opinion by Brandeis, J.;
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In this climate of enthusiasm for the Arlidge decision, the National
Labor Relations Board, which was created in 1935, worked out its
decision practice under law school influence and guidance.28 Writing
Northern Pacific R. R. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39 at 42-45, 45
S. Ct. 412 (1925), unanimous opinion by Brandeis, J.; Florida v. United States, 282
U. S. 194 at 208-209, 214-215, 51 S. Ct. 119 (1931); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 at 49-50, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S.
329 at 335-337, 338-340, 53 S. Ct. 167 (1932), unanimous opinion by Stone, J.;
Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266 at 274277, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933), unanimous opinion by Hughes, C., J.; Southern Ry. v.
Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 at 194-199, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933); United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 at 464, 55 S. Ct. 268 (1935), unanimous opinion
by Brandeis, J.; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 1), 294
U.S. 63 at 68-71, 55 S. Ct. 316 (1935), opinion by Cardozo, J.; West Ohio Gas
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 2), 294 U. S. 79 at 81, 55 S. Ct. 324
(1935), unanimous opinion by Cardozo, J.; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 38 at 45-54, 73-75, 82-84, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936), opinion by
Hughes, C. J., and concurring opinion by Brandeis, J.; Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468 at 473-482, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936), unanimous opinion by Hughes, J.;
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I at
46-47, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
301 U.S. 292 at 296-307, 57 S. Ct. 724 (1937), unanimous opinion by Cardozo, J.;
Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 at 393, 58 S. Ct.
334 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 at 48-49, 58
S. Ct. 459 (1938), unanimous opinion by Brandeis, J.; Morgan v. United States,
304 U. S. I at 14-15, 19, 22, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938); Edison Co.' v. National
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 at 229-230, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); Driscoll
v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104 at 122, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939), concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.; Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 at 143-144, 60 S. Ct. 437 (1940), unanimous opinion
by Frankfurter, J.; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 at 236-238, 240-241, 60
S. Ct. 472 (1940), unanimous opinion by Black, J.; National Labor Relations Board
v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318 at 342, 60 S. Ct. 918 (1940), unanimous
opinion of Black, J. See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 147; Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9; National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., (C. C. A. 9th, I 941) I I 8 F. ( 2d) 980. The Morgan
decisions are nowhere criticized, the Arlidge decision and the "departmental tradition"
are nowhere defended, in the report of the Attorney General's Committee or in the
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See also notes
19 and 2 I above.
28 J. Warren Madden, the first Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board,
was a Professor of Law in the University of Pittsburgh Law School, and was formerly
Dean of the University of West Virginia Law School, and is now a Judge of the
United States Court of Claims. According to Chairman Madden, the board's decision
practice was founded by Calvert Magruder, general counsel of the so-called old National
Labor Relations Board. 2 B. N. A., Smith Investigating Committee Verbatim Record
561-563 (1940). This is a verbatim record published by the Bureau of National
Affairs of the Hearings before the House Special Committee to Investigate the National
Labor Relations Board and the Operation of the National Labor Relations Act under
House Resolution 2 58, 76th Cong., 1st sess. ( I 93 9-40). There is also an official
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in February 1939, J. Warren Madden, then Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Board, described the decision practice then followed
by that board: "During the past three years the Board has issued some
I ,200 decisions. At the present time there are several hundred cases
pending before the Board for decision. The average record in each
case is well over 1,000 pages. It can readily be seen from these figures
that the Board members themselves cannot expect to read the records.
In making its decisions the Board therefore avails itself of assistants
known as review attorneys who are under the direction of an assistant
general counsel and a group of supervisors. The review attorneys
analyze the evidence, inform the Board of the contentions of all parties
and the testimony relating thereto, and make initial drafts of the
Board's findings and order." 24
According to the decision practice followed by the National Labor
Relations Board in 1939 and 1940,25 the three members of the board
saw and heard no witnesses, and could not possibly personally consider
the pleadings, testimony, exhibits, evidence, trial examiners' reports,
respondents' objections, respondents' exceptions and respondents' briefs
in the welter of cases coming before the board for adjudication. 26
transcript with different paging. Mr. Magruder was Professor of Law in the Harvard
Law School, and is now Circuit Judge in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School, was
a Chairman of the old National Labor Relations Board. For Mr. Garrison's views on
the board's decision practice in 1940, prior to his concurrence in the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, see 2 B. N. A., SMITH
INVESTIGATING CoMMI'ITEE VERBATIM RECORD 500, 506-508 (1940).
24 Madden, "Administrative Procedure: National Labor Relations Board," 45
W. VA. L. Q. 93 at 96 (1939).
25 See testimony of the board's review attorneys and the chairman and the general
counsel and other officials of the board in Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives,
76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939) {hereinafter called House Labor Committee Hearings),
and in Hearings on National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments, S. 1000,
1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, and S. 2123 before the Committee on Education
and Labor, United States Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., and before the Smith Investigating Committee, 1 B. N. A., VERBATIM RECORD 367-368, 382-387, 391-392, 418420, 428, 430-431, 434,437,440, 444, 446-447, 449-451, 462, 519-525, 529-532,
596,600, 61I-612; 2 id. 178-180, 183-184, 191-192, 198, 226, 233-236, 264-267,
289- 295, 298-300, 327, 335; 3 id. 447, 450-452, 475, 477-478, 483-484, 486,
522, 585-587, 665-667, 674-676, 692-693. See also SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTEE INTERMEDIATE REPORT transmitted March 30, 1940 to the House of Representatives, H. REP. 1902, 76th Cong., 3rd sess. 46-51, and SMITH INVESTIGATING
CoMMI'ITEE FINAL REPORT transmitted Jan. 3, 1941 to the House of Representatives,
H. REP. 3109, 76th Cong., 3rd sess. 141-146.
26 l B. N. A., SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 430-43 1,
440; 2 id. 234-236, 298-299, 557-558, 561-563. Testifying in January 1940 before
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the Smith Investigating Committee, the board's chairman, J. W. Madden, filed the
following tabulations (2 id. 358, 360; Exhibits No. 15 and 19, OFFICIAL HEARINGS,

pp. 2730, 2599):
NUMBER OF DECISIONS RENDERED AND PAGES OF TESTIMONY COVERED
BY SUCH DECISIONS TO DECEMBER 1, 1939
Number of decisions rendered

I

Complaint cases Representation cases
Calendar
Year

1935
1936
1937
1938
1939 to December 1)

I

Con- StipulaCon• Stipulatested tions Total tested tions Total

0
0
13
84

271

266

125

Grand Total ----587

222

4
70
60
187

3
29
102
289

0

39 1

205

809

628

4
70
73

I
I

Total
Total StipuContested lated

0

Total
pages of
testimony
covered by
decisions

Grand
Total

3,572
49,866
95,937
395,251

l

3
30
102
290

7
99
162
476

13
85

7
100
1 75
561

0

205

471

125

596

485,641

1,439

1,030,267

0

2

630

1,215

224

VOLUMES AND PRINTED PAGES OF DECISIONS ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD UP TO JANUARY 1, 1940
BOUND
Volume
Pages
Volume
I _____________
1,020 VIII
1,122
IX
II - - - - - - - ~ - - X
949
III ------------------IV
1,202
XI
V
1,021
XII
XIII
828
VI --•-----------XIV
VII 1,293
Total
NoT YET BOUND
Pages
Volume
XVII
_______
1,260 estimated
1,100 estimated XVIII
Total

Volume

xv

XVI

Pages
1,374
1,305
1,500
1,470
1,495
1,341
1,290
17,210

Pages
1,380 estimated
1,348 estimated
5,088

Chairman Madden also filed the following tabulations comparing the work of the
board with the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Board of Tax Appeals, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission (2 B. N. A.,
RECORD 360; Exhibit No. 18, OFFICIAL HEARINGS, p. 273 I):
HEARINGS CLOSED AND TOTAL PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT TAKEN IN SUCH HEARINGS
1936

Hearings

N. L. R. B. I. C. C. _

175
---S.&E.c. _ _ _ _

Agri.

------

Bd. of T. A. _ _
F.T.C. _ _
F. C. C. --- - -

1937

Pages

87,892
207,546
88,ooo

Hearings

136
99,493
2,604ap. 247,092
60,000
398
582

68,ooo

1938

Pages

41,159
68,ooo

Hearings

1,019
3,604
373
60
1,081

1939

Pages

Hearings

Pages

913,845
321,898
56,396
28,883
52,662
68,ooo

654
6,043
414
43
1,218

624,351
510,683
u4,278
l 7,333
61,157
68,723
45,000

567

Chairman Madden testified in January and February, 1940 that "there have been some
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Records and reports received from the board's trial examiners were
turned over unread by the board to the board's review section, comprising more than one hundred young men and young women averaging about thirty years of age, most of whom had little or no trial experience. Many had had no previous legal experience of any kind,21
and a number had been selected because of their pronounced "liberal"
sympathies.28 In sessions lasting from a fraction of an hour to several
hours, with two and sometimes only one of the board's three members
in attendance,2° one member declining on principle to participate in
the practice,30 one of these young men or young women with one supervisor outlined orally so much of the hundreds and sometimes thousands
of pages of the record as he from his limited experience conceived to
be important for deciding the case. 31 In preparing these oral outlines to
these two members of the board, these young men and young women
frequently took into consideration matters that were outside the
record. 82 On these oral outlines from these young men and young
women these two board members, or sometimes only one, arrived at
the board's decisions, though occasionally they might also ask questions
25,000 cases which have had to be disposed of one way or another by the Board over
a period of four and one-half years," and in connection with those 25,000 cases "aside
from the drafts of decisions and that sort of thing in the review division, there are
something like 2,800,000 sheets of writings in our files • • • not including • • • the
pages of testimony." 2 B. N. A. RECORD 401; OFFICIAL HEARINGS, p. 2663.
21 House Labor Committee Hearings I u7-1 II9, II23-1128 (1939); I B. N. A.
SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 532, 611, 612; 2 id. 178180, 198, 233, 266, 267, 289-295, 298, 327; 3 id. 450-452, 522; SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTEE INTERMEDIATE REPORT 46-51; SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTE~ FINAL REPORT 141-146.
28 I B. N. A. SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 434; 2 id.
179-180, 266-267; SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE INTERMEDIATE REPORT 4651; SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 141-146.
29 1 B. N. A. SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 520; 2 id.
191-192.
30 I id. 520; 2 id. 191-192, 557-558, 561-564; 3 id. 665-666; SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 141-146.
31 l B. N. A., SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 382, 385387, 391, 392, 418-420, 430-43 1, 437, 440, 443-:450, 520-525, 529-531; 2 id.
197-198, 226, 233-236, 264-267, 291-293, 298-300, 327, 335, 347; 3 id. 450452,475, 477-473, 557-564, 585-587, 665-667, 674-675, 692-693; SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTEE INTERMEDIATE REPORT 46-51; SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 141-146.
32 I B. N. A., SMITH INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD 386, 387,
430,431, 521-525, 529-531, 596; 2 id. 198; 3 id. 50-55, 450-452, 475-478, 585587; SMITH INVESTIGATING INTERMEDIATE REPORT 46-51; SMITH INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 141-146.
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or read portions of the record on points arising out of the oral outlines
presented by these review attorneys. 83
What supermen in decision-making the three members of the
National Labor Relations Board were, or purported to be, as compared
with federal judges and other agency members, appears from the following tabulation compiled from the official published reports of the
respective courts and agencies below mentioned, showing the number
of printed pages of reported decisions for each of the years 1936 to
1940 respectively of the National Labor Relations Board ( comprising
three members), as compared with the number of printed pages of
reported decisions of the federal courts and various commissions:
1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

1,427

2,295

7,185

10,416

12,496

1,938

2,101

1,983

2,028

2,096

609

587

586

543

555

463

453

485

584

621

447

3 27

174

161

224

25

14

92

110

105

5,3 24

6,079

6,087

6,663

7,o95

4,082

3,878

4,071

4,493

4,602

1,844

2,228

2,755

2,513

2,985

2,963

3,140

2,965

3,439

3,022
(incomplete)

Securities and Exchange Commission (comprising 5 commissioners)

7o9

1,024

1,471

2,318

1,682
(incomplete)

Federal Communications Commisssion (comprising 7 commissioners)

1,190

1,012

1,343

National Labor Relations Board
comprising 3 members ____
Supreme Court of U.S. (comprising 9 justices)
Court of Appeals for D.C. (com(comprising 6 justices) _____
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (comprising 5 judges)_
Court of Claims (comprising 5
judges)
District Court for D.C. (comprising II justices)
All ten Circuit Court of Appeals
(comprising 50 judges) ___
All eighty-four District Courts of
U.S. (comprising 159 judges)_
U.S. Board of Tax Appeals (comprising 16 judges)
Federal Trade Commission (comprising 5 commissioners) _ _

187 (no reports
(incomplete) available)

Chairman Madden defended the National Labor Relations Board's
decision practice chiefly on the ground that by no other practice could
ss I B. N. A., SMITH
387, 440; 2 id. 299.

INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD

382, 385-
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the board keep up with its work.84 Chairman Madden admitted that
in the board's decision practice a "problem of fair hearing ... has been
raised ... which has thus far not been finally disposed of by the courts .
. . . And it can scarcely be doubted that the issue is a vital one in judicial
procedure." 85 Other writers have made more specific criticisms of
the anonymous decision practice. Chester T. Lane, General Counsel
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stated that a trial examiner's report which may be entirely disregarded in the decision has no
value to the parties for the purpose of taking exceptions or arguing on
appeal.86 James M. Landis, former Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and now Dean of the Harvard Law School,
declared that anonymous decisions tend toward the writing of opinions
based on general impressions rather than on well-thought-out reasons 81
and that they undermine the litigants' belief that justice is being done. 88
84 See Chairman Madden's testimony in z B. N. A., SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMI'ITEE VERBATIM RECORD 354, 358-360, 401, 558. See also Madden, "Administrative Procedure: National Labor Relations Board," 45 W. VA. L. Q. 93 at 96 (1936);
Madden: Address before Legal Institute of American Bar Association on Practice and
Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, printed in l B. N. A., SMITH INVESTIGATING CoMMI'ITEE VERBATIM RECORD 440 (1940); Madden, Address in "Symposium
on Administrative Law," 9 AM. L. ScH. REv. 144 at 146-147 (1939).
85 Madden, Address in "Symposium on Administrative Law," 9 AM. L. ScH. REV.
144 at 153 (1939).
86 Lane, Address in "Symposium on Administrative Law," 9 AM. L. ScH. REV.
154 at 160 (1939): "If the Commission is free wholly to disregard the trial examiner's
report, it may be questioned whether the report adequately serves one of its most important supposed functions, that of notifying the parties of the issues involved. The
issues discussed in such a report may not be the issues which move the Commission.
Exceptions and argument directed to a report which has no binding quality may be
futile."
81
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 105-106 (1938): "members of an
administrative agency rarely have the time and opportunity for thoroughly scrutinizing
a record and coming to their own conclusions as to what it establishes. Their other
functions may be so time-consuming that the actual process of adjudication is delegated,
subject to only slight supervision. The worst consequence is the practice of reaching
conclusions without articulation of the reasons that underlie them. . •. But even
, though delegation may not lead to this result, it will mean that the laborious process
of articulation is not indulged in by the individual who has the responsibility of
judgment. Any judge can testify to the experience of working on opinions that won't
write with the result that his conclusions are changed because of his inability to state
to his satisfaction the reasons upon which they depend. Delegation of opinion writing
has the danger of forcing a cavalier treatment of a record in order to support a conclusion reached only upon a superficial examination of that record. General impressions rather than that tightness that derives from the articulation of reasons may thus
govern the trend of administrative adjudication."
88
Landis, Address in "Symposium on Administrative Law," 9 AM. L. ScH. REv.
181 at 182-183 (1939).
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Several writers having less actual service in administrative agencies
than Messrs. Madden, Lane and Landis have been less critical of the
National Labor Relations Board's decision practice. Writing in 1939,
before he became director of the Attorney General's Committee's investigating staff, Professor Walter Gellhorn brushed aside all criticisms
of the board's decision practice as being "heat" rather than "light" and
stated: "By some the Board has been denounced for methods alleged
to be un-American and not in harmony with the genius of our democratic institutions. The authors are satisfied that the denunciations find
no support in fact. . .. [The Board's] procedure ... fully preserves
the basic values of traditional judicial processes." 89 These views expressed in 1939 must now be regarded as refuted and reversed by the
conclusions and recommendation of the report of the Attorney General's Committee in which every member of the committee and Professor Gellhorn as director unanimously concurred.40 Writing in 1938
Professor Milton Handler acutely analyzed the bearings of the Morgan case on what he assumed to be the National Labor Relations
Board's decision practice. After pointing out various "doubts" and
"dangers," Professor Handler concluded that "While the magnitude
of the Board's labors and the limitations of personnel and funds preclude a degree of personal attention to details by Board members which
might be desirable, and make inevitable some compromise with the
ideals of administrative procedure, its methods of hearing and deciding
do not appear to offend any constitutional requirements of fair hearing." 41 The revelations in the testimony of review attorneys and the
chairman and general counsel of the board before the Smith Investigating Committee conclusively demonstrated all the "doubts" and "dangers" which Professor Handler pointed out, and refuted most of his
assumptions as to what the board's decision practice really was. 42
39 Gellhorn and Linfield, "Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms
of N. L. R. B. Procedure," 39 CoL. L. REv. 339 at 394-395 (1939).
40 REPORT iv. But Professor Gellhorn in his Schouler Lectures on Federal Administrative Proceedings at Johns Hopkins University in May, 1941, appears to recant
his January, 1941 concurrence in the Attorney General's Committee's Report and to
rebound to his 1939 views. See GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
130-131 (1941). For comment on Professor Gellhorn's 1939 views, see PENNOCK,
ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 91 (1941).
41 Handler, "The Morgan Case and the National Labor Relations Board," C.C.H.
LABOR LAw CoMMENTS No. 5 (1938).
42 The courts have thus far been reluctant to review the board's decision practice,
or to issue interrogatories or commissions, or to compel answers by the board that
might bring the board's decision practice before the courts for review. National
Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d)
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"Anonymous" decision-making, such as was condoned in the
Arlidge decision; and was rejected in the Morgan decision, and is condemned in the report of the Attorney General's Committee, has been
defended on the ground that "before we prepare to upset a working
arrangement of long standing" some instances of "suspected injustice"
ought to be shown.48 The answer is short as regards American administrative agencies. In each the duty and responsibility of deciding is
vested not in the agency as an organization but in the duly appointed
heads of the agency.44 If all the Supreme Court Justices should delegate
to their legal secretaries the entire business of decision-making and
decision-writing, there conceivably might be little diminution in the
quality of the decisions and few instances of "suspected injustice," but
the decisions would no longer be the decisions of the Supreme Court.45

II
How

FAR SHOULD ADJUDICATING FUNCTIONS BE SEPARATED
FROM OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES?

Commingling the adjudicating, investigating and prosecuting functions in the same administrative agency is a subject on which strong
263; National Labor Relations Board v. Lane Cotton Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940)
108 F. (2d) 568, with which compare National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry
Cotton Mills, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 444; Ford Motor Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 1003; National Labor
Relations Board v. Louisville Refining Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 678,
cert. den., 308 U. S. 568, 60 S. Ct. 81 (1939); National Labor Relations Board v.
Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 5 L. R. R. 764, 2 Lab. Cas. 571; Inland
Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 246;
Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A.
·7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 611; Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 953; Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 3 Lab. Cas. 60,419; National Labor Relations
Board v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 16; Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 114 F.
(2d) 930; National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941)
118 F. (2d) 766; Bethlehem Steel Co.,,. National Labor Relations Board, (App. D. C.
1941) 120 F. (2d) 641.
43
Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REv.
1201 at 1214, see also 1211-1220 (1939). See also Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 428429 (1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L.
REv. 589 at 600-602 (1941).
·
44
For example, see National Labor Relations Act,§§ 3(a), 10(a)-(e), 49 Stat.
L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 153(a), 16o(a)-(e); Federal Trade
Commission Act, §§ 1, 5(a)-(c), 38 Stat. L. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S. C.
(Supp. 1939), §§ 41, 45(a)-(c).
45 See U. S. Constitution, Art. III, § 1.
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views have been expressed by many authorities on administrative law.
"The Trade Commission," in Judge Charles M. Hough's lively phrase,
"like many other modern administrative legal experiments, is called
upon simultaneously to enact the roles of complainant, jury, judge and
counsel. This multiple impersonation is difficult, and the maintenance
of fairness perhaps not easy." 46
The danger of combining these functions in one agency has also
been pointed out by Gerard C. Henderson. 47 He declared that human
frailty makes judicial impartiality most difficult under a statutory procedure which requires that the commission be the formal complainant
in the very litigation in which it is also the judge. This procedure was
adopted for the laudable purposes of permitting the commission to
represent the public interest, to take the initiative where private parties
might prefer to let matters rest, and to exclude petty squabbles of little
public importance. In the opinion of Mr. Henderson, those objectives
could still be achieved under a formal procedure which separated the
judicial and prosecuting functions.
Similar opinions have been expressed by John Dickinson, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce from 1933 to 1935 and Assistant Attorney
General from 1935 to 1937,48 and by Professor Harold J. Laski, whose
46
John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 299
F. 468 at 471, unanimous opinion by Hough, C. J.
47
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 83, 327-329 (1924).
48
"It is of the essence of legal rules that they should be founded on broader considerations than those which spring from the special class of situations to which any
particular rule may apply. They must take into account the habits and attitude of mind
of the whole community as gleaned from the sum-total of its transactions. • • • The
generalizations and precedents which an expert body of specialists develops in the
course of its jurisdiction should, of course, form the basis of any rules that are generated. But the narrow angle from which they are formulated, and the fact that they
are formulated in such close proximity to purely technical problems and difficulties,
strengthens the belief that they should be touched off into greater generality by a
tribunal which has under its jurisdiction the whole field of legal relations .•••
" •.• Under the administrative method, government acts directly as one of
the parties to the proceeding, often on its own motion. The controversy thus comes to be
one, not between private individuals, but between an individual on one side and
government on the other. The defendant has the mobilized force of the organized
community against him. For a person in this position our traditional law has always
been peculiarly sedulous. The principle has always been that the individual is entitled
to the protection of the law against possible governmental aggression. And, although
it is true that this principle developed when government was not yet responsible to the
community and that such responsibility has been subsequently established, it is needful
to remember that even a popular government must operate through fallible human
agents, whose action may be arbitrary or prejudiced. The danger is especially great in
the case of the petty bureaucrats who wield minor administrative authority. These
persons are immune from the light of publicity which beats on the occupants of high
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association with Justice Holmes, Harvard University, University of
London, and the Labor Party in Great Britain, and whose numerous
studies in administrative law there and in America, have raised him to
the first rank of authority on this subject.49
Promptly after Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England,
published The New Despotism in 1929, the Labor Government then
in office, through its Lord High Chancellor, Lord Sankey, after consultation with the Prime Minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald, and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, appointed in 1929 a
committee to consider the whole subject of ministers' powers. 50 This
office, and are relieved by their sheer obscurity from effective ~esponsibility to public
opinion.
"The dangers of oppression by small office-holders are enhanced by another
feature of the machinery of administrative justice. Not merely does the citizen find
himself opposed by officials with the whole weight of the public force behind them,
but the very officials who are his adversaries are also the judges in the cause. The
health board or building inspector, or whatever body or official it may be, that acts as
the adjudicating agency, is generally also the complainant in the case. However honest
may be the intention of officials under such circumstances, they are humanly actuated
by a desire to justify their proceedings. They are not likely to decide against themselves in a proceeding to which they are a party, or to go very deeply into the merits
of a case to· determine whether or not they should do so. There is an ever valid insight
in Coke's dictum that the same persons ought not to be judges and parties in the
same case.'' DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JusTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LA.w IN
THE UNITED STATES 234, 252-253 (1927).
49
"Every citizen needs the amplest protection against the danger that the administrator will himself interpret the meaning of the law that he applies. The concentration
of the power to interpret in the same hands as the power to administer has always,
historically, been associated with tyranny. It was the characteristic hall-mark of
Oriental despotism. Even with a bureaucracy so generally impartial as that of British
India it has not been free from grave objection. Where the subject to be administered
is in its nature so complex-as when, for example, an attempt is made to fix a 'fair'
gas-rate in a municipality-those who adjudge fairness ought never, even if they are
not the ordinary courts, to be those who usually administer the service. It may be
necessary, given the intricate nature of the modern State, to create special courts for
special subjects. Whatever the solution, the separation and supremacy of the judicial
power is integral to the maintenance of rights. For, otherwise, those who serve the
State are governed by rules different from those under which their fellow-citizens must
live. They are made judges in their own cause; and however hard they may strive to
do justice they cannot hold squarely the balance between themselves and other men."
LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 129-130 (1925).
50
Among the members of this committee were the Earl of Donoughmore, Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords, Sir Leslie Scott, formerly Solicitor General
and now Lord Justice Scott, one of the Justices of Appeals; Sir John Anderson, later
Governor of Bengal, Lord Privy Seal, Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security;
the Earl of Clarendon, later Governor General of the Union of South Africa; Gavin
Simonds, later Justice Simonds, Judge of Chancery Bivision, High Court of Justice;
Sir Warren Fisher, head of the Civil Service and former Chairman of the Board of
Inland Revenue, Sir Claud Schuster, Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor;
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committee took evidence and held fifty-five meetings over a period
of two years, and in March, 1932, submitted to the Lord High Chancellor its report, in which the committee was unanimous as regards all
passages here quoted in the footnotes from this report, and in April,
1932 the Lord High Chancellor by command of His Majesty presented
this report to Parliament. 51 The Committee on Ministers' Powers well
knew how the investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating functions
were commingled in American administrative agencies, but the committee unanimously turned away from this commingling, and sought
for a way to prevent all possibility of any administrative agency ever
acting as judge in its own cause.52
Rev. James Barr, M.P., Chairman of the Consultative Committee of the Parliamentary
Labor Party; Robert Richards, former Under Secretary for India; Ellen Wilkinson,
M.P., later Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Pensions; Sir William S. Holdsworth, Vinerian Professor of English Law in University of Oxford and author of the
monumental History of English Law, and Professor H. J. Laski, who as already said
stands in the first rank of authority on administrative law.
51
COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' PowERS REPORT (1932) (Cmd. 4060).
52 Whenever "a Minister, having ascertained the facts, is obliged by the statute
to decide solely in accordance with the law, the decision is judicial. The fact that it is
not reached by a court so-called, but by a Minister acting under statutory powers and
under specialized procedure will not make the decision any the less judicial. • ••
"The first and most fundamental principle of natural justice is that a man may
not be a judge in his own cause. • •• But disqualifying interest is not confined to
pecuniary interest. . •• Indeed we think it is clear that bias from strong and sincere
conviction as to public policy may operate as a more serious disqualification than
pecuniary interest. No honest man acting in a judicial capacity allows himself to be
influenced by pecuniary interest: if anything, the danger is likely to be that through
fear of yielding to motives of self-interest he may unconsciously do an injustice to the
party with which his pecuniary interest may appear to others to identify him. But the
bias to which a public-spirited man is subjected if he adjudicates in any case in which
he is interested on public grounds is more subtle and less easy for him to detect and
resist.
''We are here considering questions of public policy and from the public point
of view it is important to remember that the principle underlying all the decisions in
regard to disqualification by reason of bias is that the mind of the judge ought to be
free to decide on purely judicial grounds and should not be directly or indirectly influenced by, or exposed to the influence of, either motives of self-interest or opinions
about policy or any other considerations not relevant to the issue.
"We are of opinion that in considering the assignment of judicial functions
to Ministers Parliament should keep clearly in view the maxim that no man is to be
judge in a cause in which he has an interest. We think that in any case in which the
Minister's Department would naturally approach the issue to be determined with a
desire that the decision should go one way rather than another, the Minister should
be regarded as having an interest in the cause. Parliament would do well in such a
case to provide that the Minister himself should not be the judge, but that the case
should be decided by an independent tribunal.
"It is unfair to impose on a practical administrator the duty of adjudicating in
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The Report of the Attorney General's Committee makes specific
recommendations to avoid the evils of commingling judicial and prosecuting functions. The most important of these are the use of hearing
commissioners and the division of duties within the agency.
" ... creation of the office of hearing commissioners ... and ...
greater delegation of administrative functions within the agencies,
would insure, internal but nevertheless real and actual separation
of the adjudicating and the prosecuting or investigating functions.
any matter in which it could fairly be argued that his impartiality would be in inverse
ratio to his strength and ability as a Minister. An easy-going and cynical Minister,
rather bored with his office and skeptical of the value of his Department, would find
it far easier to apply a judicial mind to purely judicial problems connected with the
Department's administration than a Minister whose head and heart were in his work.
It is for these reasons and not because we entertain the slightest suspicion of the good
faith or the intellectual honesty of Ministers and their advisers that we are of opinion
that Parliament should be chary of imposing on Ministers the ungrateful task of giving
judicial decisions in matters in which their very zeal for the public service can scarcely
fail to bias them unconsciously.
" •.. Where it appears that the policy of the Department might be substantially
better served by a decision one way rather than another, the first principle of natural
justice will come into play, and the Minister should not be called upon to perform the
incongruous task of dealing with the judicial part of the quasi-judicial decision as an
impartial judge, when ex hypothesi he and his Department want the decision to be
one way rather than another." CoMMI'ITEE ON MINISTERs' PowERS REPORT 74, 76-79
(1932).
These conclusions in which the entire Committee on Ministers' Powers concurred are so devastating to the Arlidge decision, the "departmental tradition," the
commingling of adjudicating and prosecuting functions, and "anonymous" decisionmaking, that it is surprising to note that as yet no adequate sympathetic appraisal of this
report has yet appeared in any American law review. Though this committee was
highly distinguished and was unanimous in these conclusions, the prevailing habit in the
American law reviews appears to be to belittle its conclusions. See Jaffe, "Invective and
Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1201 at 1203-1221 (1939);
Landis, "Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1077 at 1081
(1940); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv.
589 at 590 (1941). Compare also CARR, CoNcERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw passim (1941). Professor Gellhorn nowhere mentions any of the conclusions
above quoted from the Committee on Ministers' Powers Report in his Schouler Lectures on Federal Administrative Proceedings at Johns Hopkins University in May,
1941. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941). Referring in
1938 to the Committee on Ministers' Powers Report and the accompanying Minutes of
Evidence, Justice Frankfurter has said they "constitute, perhaps, the most illuminating
analysis yet formulated of those processes which are the stuff of administrative law."
Frankfurter, "Foreword to a Discussion of Current Developments in Administration
Law," 47 YALE L. J. 515 at 518 (1938). Doubtless the Attorney General's Committee
knew and was influenced by the conclusions above quoted from the Committee on
Ministers' Powers Report, but they are nowhere quoted in the Attorney General's
Committee's Report nor in the Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
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The person who heard and weighed the evidence, who made the
initial findings of fact and the initial order in each case, would be
entirely different from those persons who had investigated the
case and presented it in formal proceedings. He would have had
no connection with the initiation or prosecution of the case. His
decision would stand unless either the attorney for the agency
or the attorney for the private party were able to demonstrate
through exceptions, appeal, and argument before the agency heads
that his findings or conclusions were in error." 53
"What remains to be discussed," declares the Committee, "is
the heart of the problem. Save at the level of the agency heads,
an internal separation of function can afford substantially complete protection against the danger that impartiality of decision
will be impaired by the personal precommitments of the investigator and the advocate. Even at the level of ultimate decision
there can be similar protection, for the sheer volume of work does
not permit the agency heads to participate actively in developing
one side of any single side but requires that they reserve themselves for the task of deciding questions presented to them by
others. Nevertheless, so far as the agency is empower:ed to initiate
action at all, the agency heads do have the responsibility of determining the general policy according to which action is taken.
They have at least residual powers to control, supervise, and direct
all the activities of the agency, including the various preliminary
and deciding phases of the process of disposing of particular cases.
The question is whether there are dangers in the possession of these
powers such as to make advisable a total separation." u
In rejecting the suggestion that the judicial powers of administrative agencies be vested in separate judicial tribunals,55 the committee
lists a number of practical diffi.culties. 56 Most obvious objection is the
multiplication of governmental agencies. Separate deciding tribunals,
the committee believes, would also create the danger of friction and
a breakdown of responsibility between the complementary agencies.
"· .. To create a special body whose single function is to prosecute will almost inevitably increase litigation.... At present the
added responsibility of deciding exercises a restraining influence
.... If only to save itself time and expense an agency will not
prosecute cases which it knows ... it will dismiss after hearing.
38
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The situation is likely to be different where the function of
prosecuting is separated out. First, a body devoted solely to prosecuting ... has no responsibility for deciding and its express job
is simply to prosecute as often and successfully as possible. Second,
it must guess what the deciding branch will think. It can explore
the periphery; it can try everything; and meanwhile the individual citizen must spend time and money before some curb can
be exercised by the deciding branch. And, it should be noted, a
separation of functions would seriously militate against what this
Committee has already noted as being, numerically and otherwise, the lifeblood of the administrative process-negotiations
and informal settlements. Clearly, amicable disposition of cases
is far less likely where negotiations are with officials devoted solely
to prosecution and where the prosecuting officials cannot turn to
the deciding branch to discover the law and the applicable
policies." 57

In addition, says the committee, confusion in the interpretation of
the statutes to be enforced would be caused by separating the prosecuting from the deciding functions. 58 The committee concludes that
mere splitting up of functions would not itself cure the criticisms which
appear most common but that the solution consists in training personnel and building up a tradition of impartiality.
"· .. predispositions ... in the more highly charged fields in
which administrative agencies operate . . . are mainly the product
of many factors of mind and experience, and have comparatively
little relation to the administrative machinery. There is no simple
way of eliminating them by mere change in the administrative
structure. They can only be exorcised by wise and self-controlled
men. The problem is inherently one of personnel and the traditions in which it is trained. . .. complete separation by no means
necessarily cures bias, which derives from deeper roots than mere
organization . . . impartiality can be achieved without separation....
"The Committee concludes, then, that complete separation of
functions would make enforcement more difficult and would not be
of compensating benefit to private interests. On the contrary, both
those private interests which the statutes are designed to protect
and those which are regulated would be likely to suffer. And
:finally, we conclude not only that separation will not necessarily
cure bias and prejudice but that the requisite impartiality of action
57

58
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can be secured by the means set forth in this and the preceding
sections of this report,"
namely the hearing commissioners recommended by the committee. 59
The views thus stated by the committee are perhaps the best attempt
so far made to answer the reasoned criticisms already quoted which
Judge Hough, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Dickinson, Professor Laski and
the Committee on Ministers' Powers have directed against commingling the adjudicating, prosecuting and investigating functions in the
same agency. Broader criticisms, more rhetorically expressed,6° have
been vigorously castigated.61 The committee's views invite analysis.
The committee concedes that "agency heads have the responsibility of determining the general policy according to which action is
taken." But it does not answer the argument of the British Committee
on Ministers' Powers that different qualities are required for a judge
than for a policy maker, because an able minister's sincere convictions
on public policy will operate consciously or unconsciously to bias his
decisions as judge.
To the reasoning of the Attorney General's Committee and that of
other apologists for commingling the adjudicating, prosecuting and
investigating functions, 62 the answer is short, as was the answer to a
69

REPORT 59-60.
See Dicey, "Development of Administrative Law in England," 3 l L. Q. REV.
148 (1915); Lord Hewart of Bury (Lord Chief Justice of England), Address before
American Bar Association, 52 A. B. A. REP. 203 (1927); HEWART, THE NEw
DESPOTISM (1929); Reports of Special Committee on Administrative Law of American Bar Association, 59 A. B. A. REP. 539-564 (1934), 61 A. B. A. REP, 720-794
(1936), 62 A. B. A. REP. 789-850 (1937), 63 A. B. A. REP. 331-368 (1938).
See also 64 A. B. A. REP. 281-282 (1939), 65 A. B. A. REP. 215-223 (1940);
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 67-71
(1937) (S. Doc. 8, 75th Cong., 1st sess.).
61
'
See the following articles by Justice (then Professor) Frankfurter: ''The Task
of Administrative Law," 75 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 614 (1927); "Foreword" preceding
Jennings, "Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing
Legislation," 49 HARV. L. REv. 426 (1936); "Foreword to a Discussion of Current
Developments in Administrative Law," 47 YALE L. J. 515 at 517-518 (1938); "Summation of the Conference," 24 A. B. A. J. 282 at 283, 285 (1938); "Foreword,"
41 CoL. L. REV. 585 (1941). See also LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-5,
47-48 (1938); Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV.
L. REv. 1201 (1939); Landis, "Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARV. L.
REV. 1077 (1940); GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEEDINGS 1-3, u71I8 (1941).
62
"It may be that these doubts are well founded, but whether they are is now
a matter of mere speculation. Has this combination impaired the judicial quality of
administrative acts? Would efficiency suffer if the two functions are separated? How
expensive would the separation be? These questions must be answered before a
60
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similar defense of "anonymous" decision-making. Where a pecuniary
bias is shown, no one quibbles about uncertainty of the effect on the
decision, the reduction in efficiency, or the cost to the public.68 The
definitive solution can be found." Feller, "Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal
Administrative Law," 47 YALE L. J. 647 at 671 (1938).
Though Professor Gellhorn in January, 1941, concurred in the Attorney General's Committee's Report, he nevertheless contends, in his Schouler Lectures on Federal Administrative Proceedings at Johns Hopkins University in May 1941, that "an
actual showing of animus, so marked as to constitute a bias" should not disqualify an
administrative adjudicator, and that the only grounds for disqualification should be
"pecuniary or other personal interest, such as family relationship," or personally acting
as "complainant, or as investigator or as advocate ('prosecutor')." GELLHORN, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 19, 18, 20 (1941).
Other partisans of the "departmental: tradition," see note 19 above, also boldly
assert that administrative agencies ought to be biased: "In some spheres the absence of
equal economic power generally is so prevalent that the umpire theory of administering law is almost certain to fail. . • . The ultimate test of the administrative is the
policy that it formulates; not the fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a
controversy on a record of their own making." LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
36, 39 (1938). " ••• a judiciary neutral towards the policy would not suffice, for the
enforcement of new policies against powerful and respected interests in the community
· demands a positive zeal towards that policy. . .• That job •.• could not have been
accomplished as successfully if the powers of investigation and adjudication had not
been combined. . . . Effective enforcement of controversial policy requires singlemindedness of purpose and attention. Not only must there be coordination of resources of information and personnel, there must also be coordination of regulation
policy, litigation policy and adjudication policy." Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REV. 589 at 599-600 (1941). See also
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 99 (1938); Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation
in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1201 at 1216-1220 (1939); Jaffe, "The
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv.
CHI. L. REV. 401 at 427 (1941). These views suggest that high emotion is here
obliterating "fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due
process in a proceeding of a judicial nature." Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S.
I at 19, 58 S. Ct. 773,999 (1938). See also other Supreme Court decisions collected in
note 22 above.
To these partisans of the "departmental tradition" may aptly be turned the same
criticism that Dean Landis once directed against the defenders of the "court tradition":
"That class has had pride in its handiwork. . •. But the claim to pride tends, especially in the hands of lesser men, to be a boast of perfection. . . . A lesser vision, fearful
of the frailty of human thought and human judgment, claims Delphic powers, and
rests .•. upon an affinity with deep and mysterious principles of justice that none but
itself can grasp. Deep resentment thus attaches to any criticism of its inadequacies,
any suggestion as to its biases." LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 135 (1938).
Nowhere in the Attorney General's Committee's Report or in the Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has anyone defended the "departmental tradition" or the Arlidge decision or advanced views similar to those of the
partisans of the "departmental tradition" quoted in this footnote.
68
Compare United States v. Manton, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 107 F. (2d) 834 at
845-846.
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judge is automatically disqualified. The same logic applies to the bias
of an administrative agent.
Such is the position of the minority of the Attorney General's Committee. They feel that in the administrative process the important
safeguards of the traditional procedure in American and English courts
are missing,6 4 and that separation in the identity of the persons of judge
and prosecutor is not enough where both are responsible to a single head
or small group of officials in control of the agency. 65 Other objections
to this commingling of functions are the opportunity for the examining
of witnesses in secret, the inspection of premises without warrant, and
the use of threats to obtain the information demanded. 66 The Department of Justice must go to the courts, and the work of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue has not been impaired by the necessity of appeal to
the Board of Tax Appeals. Moreover, the prosecuting agency would
not have to litigate to find out what policy to pursue. Through its
rule-making power it may prescribe policies just as the Commissioner
6

'

REPORT 203-204.

65

"Special problems are raised where there is no complete separation of functions,
but an agency attempts to separate functions within its own staff. Fir~t, can there be
a practical separation of prosecuting and deciding functions where both are subject to
one ultimate authority? To a limited extent, we think it may be possible to achieve
such a separation. Secondly, is it proper for an agency, which must decide cases, to
supervise generally the institution and prosecution of such cases? We think such
supervision is inevitable, given the organization of prosecuting and deciding functions
within a single governmental unit which must have a single ultimate head. While the
effectiveness of any form of internal separation is thereby limited, such supervision is a
necessary part of the present system of administrative justice. ThirdJy, is it proper
for deciding officers to participate in attempted settlements or informal determinations?
Here again, for the same reasons, complete separation of functions is impossible within
a single agency. Fourthly, shall deciding officers go beyond the formal record in
contested proceedings and, after formal proceedings are commenced, consult with the
agency's own prosecuting attorneys, investigators, experts, and specialists? Emphatically,
we think (and the Committee fully agrees) that at this stage of procedure deciding
officers should, except for proper use of official notice and clerical help, confine their
consideration strictly to matters of record produced during formal proceedings.
"At best, internal separation of functions is difficult to achieve. . .. So long as
both investigators and prosecutors, on the one hand, and hearing and deciding officers,
on the other, are subject to the same superior authority, there is an inevitable commingling of all these functions. Hearing and deciding officers cannot be wholly
independent so long as their appointments, assignments, personnel records, and reputations are subject to control by an authority which is also engaged in investigating and
prosecuting. Of course, this dependence may be diminished by various devices, as the
Committee has very rightly attempted. We think it clear, however, that such dependence cannot be eliminated by measures short of complete segregation into independent agencies." Minority views, REPORT 208-209.
66
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of Internal Revenue does, and the adjudicating tribunal will in general
do no more than apply these policies to individual cases.07
The minority does not object to the taking of evidence by the
agency or to its use of hearing commissioners in the lower stages of
trial. But they do feel that the ultimate hearing of contested cases
should be by a completely independent tribunal. 08
67 REPORT 206-207. In support of their position the minority of the committee
here quote from the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, S. Doc. 8, 7 5th Cong., 1st sess., "Reorganization of the Executive
Departments," and also from President Roosevelt's letter endorsing this report and
transmitting it to the Senate, Jan. 12, 1937. In this Report on Administrative Management it was stated that the independent regulatory commissions set up to exercise
control over commerce and business were in reality miniature independent governments and constituted "a headless 'fourth branch' of the Government, a haphazard
deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers." Id. 40 (S. Doc. 8, p. 67).
Attention was called to the internal inconsistency in the make-up and functions of
these commissions: they are vested with administrative and policy determining duties
with respect to which they should be responsible to the President, and at the same
time they are given important judicial work in the doing of which they ought to be
wholly independent of executive control. The resulting evils were declared to be
"insidious and far-reaching."
.
" . • . In the first place, governmental powers of great importance are being
· exercised under conditions of virtual irresponsibility. We speak of the 'independent'
regulatory commissions. It would be more accurate to call them the 'irresponsible'
regulatory commissions, for they are areas of unaccountability. It is not enough to
point out that these irresponsible commissions have of their own volition been honest
and competent. Power without responsibility has no place in a government based on
the theory of democratic control, for responsibility is the people's only weapon, their
only insurance against abuse of power. • •• the independent commission is obliged to
carry on judicial functions under conditions which threaten the impartial performance
of that judicial work. The discretionary work of the administrator is merged with that
of the judge. Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions
render escape from these subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men
are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines
judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions
affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations
of the preliminary findings which the commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented
to itself." Id. 40 (S. Doc. 8, pp. 67-68).
In his letter to the Senate transmitting this Report on Reorganization of the
Executive Departments, President Roosevelt said: "I have examined this report carefully and thoughtfully, and am convinced that it is a great document of permanent
importance. I think that the general program presented by the Committee is adequate, reasonable, and practical, and that it furnishes the basis for immediate action.
The broad facts are known; the need is clear; what is now required is action. • •. The
Committee •.. points out that the practice of creating independent regulatory commissions, who perform administrative work in addition to judicial work, threatens to develop a 'fourth branch' of the Government for which there is no sanction in the
Constitution." Id. iii, iv.
68
REPORT 207-209.
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Going beyond Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt, Chief
Justice Groner advocates a completely independent board on the order
of the Board of Tax Appeals, with unrestricted power to review adjudications of all agencies. 69 But realizing the practical impossibility of
obtaining that, Chief Justice Groner suggests that "the new official be
appointed by the proposed Office of Administrative Procedure wholly
on its own responsibility, receive his salary from it and not from the
agency's funds, be answerable to it alone, and be assigned by the Office
to the hearing of cases as the needs of the agencies require. And, more
important still, I strongly recommend that whenever on appeal to it
an agency rejects the findings of fact of the commissioner, the agency's
action in that regard be made subject to judicial review in the light of
the court's own impressions of the weight of the evidence." 70

III
How FAR SHOULD HEARING CoMMISSIONERS BE INDEPENDENT
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES?

The official who hears the evidence and reports the facts to the
agency is in most cases merely an advisor with no real power to decide.
This is true of both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission. The real instruments for shaping a decision have been the intermediate reports, exceptions thereto, and oral
arguments on the exceptions. Staffs of review attorneys or examiners
have been created as aids. Some agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Board, have engaged distinct sections of attorneys. Others,
such as the Federal Communications Commission, have used the members of their regular legal staffs. In all cases, great reliance has been
placed upon subordinates other than the hearing officer.71 When responsibility for decision is taken away from the hearing officer, the
hearing itself degenerates and the decision becomes anonymous.

"In those agencies where the hearing officer plays, and is
known to play, an important part in the disposition of the case,
he exercises real authority in keeping the testimony to the relevant
and important issues, reducing its volume and sharpening the
issues. Where this is not the case, the testimony wanders and the
proceeding loses direction. Evidence is admitted 'for what it is
worth' or 'for the information of' the agency, time is lost and
expense increased. Also, if the hearing officer is not to play an
69
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important part in the decision of the case, other persons must.
The agency heads cannot read the voluminous records and winnow out the essence of them. Consequently, this task must be
delegated to subordinates. Competent as these anonymous reviewers or memorandum writers may be, their entrance makes for
loss of confidence. Parties have a sound desire to make their arguments and present their evidence, not to a monitor, but to the
officer who must in the first instance decide or recommend the
decision. In many agencies attorneys rarely exercise the privilege of arguing to the hearing officer. They have no opportunity
to argue to the record analysts and reviewers who have not heard
the evidence but whose summaries may strongly affect the final
result." 12
Taking responsibility from the hearing officer has had another bad
effect, the committee believes. It has resulted that the office does not
attract men of ability. To insure that men whose ability and fairness
have been recognized by the bar and the public will be obtained, and
that both public and private interests will be protected, responsibility
must be restored and adequate salaries and tenure guaranteed. 7 8 The
committee recommends terms of seven years, the commissioners to be
removable only upon formal charges of fraud, neglect of duty, incompetence, or other impropriety.74 It approves salaries of $7,500 for
hearing commissioners 75 and $8,500 for chief hearing commissioners, to
be subject neither to reduction nor increase during the term of office.
To make these innovations effective, the decision of the hearing
commissioner must, according to the commission, be made final and
effective without further action or consideration by the agency. However, the committee recommends that to preserve uniformity of decision and effective supervision of an agency's work, the parties, including the agency's trial attorney, be permitted to appeal. It also
recommends that the agency heads be allowed, within the period for
appeal, to take up any decision for review upon their own motion. In
other respects, however, the relationship between the hearing commissioner and the agency upon an appeal would be similar to that of
trial and appellate court:
"· •. Conclusions, interpretations, law, and policy should, of
course, be open to full review. On_ the other hand, on matters
72

REPORT 45-46.
78 REPORT 46-47.

Id.
The committee suggests that in agencies which deal with many small cases, a
salary of $5,000 might be authorized. REPORT 46.
74
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which the hearing commissioner, having heard the evidence and
seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency should
be reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown.
And in the event that the agency does find facts contrary to those
found by the hearing commissioner, the agency's opinion should
articulate with care and particularity the reasons for its departures,
not only to disclose the rationale to the courts in case of subsequent
review but to assure that the agency will not carelessly disregard
the decision of the hearing commissioner." 76
Several agencies oppose this as making the hearing commissioners
too independent of the agencies. 77 Mr. John Foster Dulles also criticizes the recommended practice on the ground that the hearing commissioner will be neither wholly independent nor wholly in the
confidence of the agency. They will primarily serve the agency and
develop a sympathy to the agency's viewpoint. They will desire to
avoid being frequently reversed by the agency and will consequently
not be able to exercise a wholly impartial and independent judgment.78
There are really two types of cases, one in which the issue is an objectively determinable fact and one in which Congress has prescribed
that the determinative element is to be the expert judgment and discretion of the agency. In the second type, the hearing commissioner
must be intimately familiar with the opinions, policies and plans of the
commission. It is this very background which disqualifies him in the
first type of case, where independent judgment is necessary to inspire
the confidence of private parties. 79 Mr. Dulles believes that independent courts alone can judge the first type of case. If special types of
knowledge are necessary, special courts can be set up.
Mr. Dulles also objects to even a temporary trial of the committee's
76

REPORT 51.
Federal Trade Commission, HEARINGS 303-304, 307; Interstate Commerce
Commission, HEARINGS 451-452. See also Horack, "Administrative Procedure: A
Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 492 at 499-500 (1941).
78
Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REV. 617 at 622-625 (1941). See also Dulles, HEARINGS n52-II56;
Davison, "Administrative Technique-The Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 628 at 633-636 (1941). But see Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CH1. L. REv. 401 at
421-428 (1941); Hart, "The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REv. 801
at 8n-813 (1941).
79
Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REV. 617 at 622-625 (1941). See also Dulles, HEARINGS n52-II56.
See similar recommendations in CoMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' PowERs REPORT 78, 92100, II5-II6 (1932).
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plan for hearing commissioners, on the ground that "vested interests"
with political backing would develop to perpetuate such positions.
So impressed is Attorney General Biddle by this problem that to
meet it he has proposed what he describes as a "fundamental amendment" to S. 675 as recommended by the majority of the Attorney
General's Committee. By this amendment, a hearing commissioner's
decision is required in all disciplinary cases, in which, as Mr. Biddle
says "there is more nearly a true prosecutor-judge situation," but in
all other cases the agencies are vested with discretion to issue a proposed
decision and to dispense with a hearing commissioner's decision. 80

IV
How FAR SHOULD ADMINISTRATIVE RuLE-MAKING BE SAFEGUARDED,
AND How FAR SHOULD RuLE MAKING AND DECLARATORY
RULING PROCEDURE BE EXTENDED?

The committee recognizes the interest of the public in being informed of the bases of decision by administrative agencies and consequently advises that whenever a policy has sufficiently crystallized to
be made an instruction to the staff it be put in the form of a definite
opinion or instruction and published as such. Rulings should have
binding effect on the agency and not be merely advisory. However,
the agency should not always be required to make a ruling in advance
upon request. Some situations are open to rapid change by subsequent
events. Then, too, the energies ·of the agency might be unduly taxed. 81
The procedure in rule-making may be either formal or informal.
The practice of holding conferences with interested parties is, the committee :finds, often as adequate as a formal hearing.82 However, the
use of public hearings is increasing. 88 The committee believes that the
holding of formal hearings in formulating rules should be made standso Biddle,
81

HEARINGS

REPORT,

1436-1437, 1450-1452.

25, 29, 31-33.

82 REPORT IOI, 102.
88 " • • • hearings are now

generally held in connection with the fixing of prices
and wages, the prescription of rules for the construction of vessels and other instruments of transportation, the regulation of the ingredients and physical properties of
food, the prescription of commodity standards, and the regulation of competitive practices. The regulation of all of these matters bears upon economic enterprise and
touches directly the financial aspects of great numbers of businesses affected, either by
imposing direct costs or by limiting opportunities for gain. Appreciation of these effects,
both by businessmen and government officials, seems to be the chief cause of the increased use of hearings in administrative rule making." REPORT 107-108.
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ard administrative practice,8 4- and also recommends a statute providing
for deferred effectiveness of all federal regulations which have statutory effect.85
S. 67 S recommended by the majority of the committee requires the
agency to make public all its general policies and interpretations of law
as soon as they have been crystallized and formulated. 86 S. 674, recommended by the minority of the committee, requires the agency to
"issue in the form of rules, all necessary or appropriate rules interpreting the statutory provisions under which it operates, and such rules
shall reflect the interpretations currently relied upon by such agency." 87
At the close of the Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee the minority stated that S. 674 which they had
recommended should be amended by deleting a declaration that "it is
the declared policy of Congress" that the agency "shall, as a fixed
policy, prefer and encourage rule making in order to reduce to a
minimum the necessity for case by case administrative adjudication,"
and by adding amendments providing that the agency need not "formulate in advance all rules necessary to cover all situations or every
contingency which may arise under the statutes administered" and may
"withhold such rule making by publishing an explanatory rule respecting each such situation." 88
Either of these bills will, if enacted, amend all statutes governing
all agencies by conferring on them discretion to make ever-expanding
rules having all the force of legislative command. A similar extension
of the rule-making power has been recommended as superior to case
by case administrative adjudication in the :field of unfair competition.89
In this field the Federal Trade Commission has had several misadventures in rules which it has promulgated under its trade practice conference procedure.00 Out of the fullness of its experience, the Federal
84

REPORT 108.
REPORT I 14. "Such a statute should contain a provision that in the discretion
of the administrative agency, to meet situations calling for more prompt action, the
period of delay might be shortened or dispensed with." Id. n5.
88
HEARINGS 1455, 1464.
87
HEARINGS 1407.
88
HEARINGS 1407.
89
Handler, "Unfair Competition," 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175 at 259-262 (1936);
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS I 5 1-152 ( l 93 8).
00
Handler, "Unfair Competition," 21 lowA L. REv. 175 at 253-255 (1936),
citing Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 42
(1930), and Myers, "The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Laws," in
HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws: A SYMPOSIUM 124 (1932). See also
Montague, "Proposals for the Revision of the Antitrust Laws," id. 23 at 30-3 I
85
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Trade Commission opposes this extension of the rule-making power
in S. 674 and S. 675: "To issue declaratory rulings or administrative
rules on matters of administrative law without legislative standards
or the initiation of a formal adversary proceeding represents the very
essence of legislative power as distinguished from! power that is judicial, quasi-judicial, executive, or administrative. No prudent or experienced agency would want such power; no other should have it." 91
To the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Acheson of the Attorney General's Committee stated: "there are large
areas where it is impracticable for agencies to issue declaratory rulings.
The situation must be one where the facts are more or less static and
can be clearly stated. Declaratory rulings probably have no place in
such dynamic fields as unfair trade practices or unfair labor practices." 02
The committee specifically disapproves any general requirement
that regulations be laid before Congress before going into effect.93
However, it recommends that each agency be required to make an annual report of its rule-making in order that Congress may act on the
basis of full information if it wishes to undo anything the agency has
done. 94 Mr. Dulles feels that such a practice would be of dubious value
(1932); Kittelle and Mostow, "A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the
Federal Trade Commission," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 427 at 436-438 (1940);
BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 95-98 (1932). For trade practice conference rules affecting sixty-two industries which the Federal Trade Commission deemed
it necessary to "revise" and "republish," see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1931, pp. 6, 107, and FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMISSioN, TRADE PRACTICE CoNFERENCES, June 30, 1933, passim.
91
Federal Trade Commission (Mr. Wooden), HEARINGS 291. See also Federal
Trade Commission, id. 284-298; Labor Department, id. 181-182; Federal Communications Commission, id. 219~221, 225-228; National Labor Relations Board, id.
263-264; Securities and Exchange Commission, id. 328, 362-369, 387, 389, 403-407;
Interstate Commerce Commission, id. 437-438, 460-461; Federal Power Commission, id. 506; Patent Office, id. 612-614; Federal Reserve Board, id. 764-765;
Bituminous Coal Division, id. 753. See also LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
82-83 (1938); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL.
L. REV. 589 at 592-596, 613, 615-616 (1941), quoting Justice Holmes, "Naturally
I think that our mode of proceeding by cases rather than by discussion of generality leads
to more accurate generalities," 2 HoLMEs-PoLLOCK LETTERS 137 (1941); Horack,
"Administrative Procedure: A Report and An Evaluation," 26 WAsH. UN1v. L. Q.
492 at 495-497, 505-506 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 409-412
(1941); Hart, "The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REv. 801 at 809-810
(1941). But see the Federal Trade Commission's draft of a proposed bill authorizing
administrative rule making against unfair competition. HEARINGS 284, 286, 307-309.
92
HEARINGS 830. See also Acheson, id. 811.
93
REPORT I 20.
9
"' REPORT 121.
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and would incur the danger that courts might be led to presume that
nonaction by Congress meant approval of the administrative regulations.96
V
How FAR SHOULD THE CouRTS REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION?

Judicial review of administrative agencies is in general taken for
granted in this country and this the committee recognizes.96 The difficulty is as to the extent and scope of such review. Both judicial and
statutory standards are vague.
"Under existing standards," says the committee, "the courts
may narrow their review to satisfy the demands for administrative discretion, and they may broaden it close to the point of
substituting their judgment for that of the administrative agency." 97
The present judicial trend is to narrow the review. 98 The committee
96
Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
,p CoL. L. REv. 617 at 620 (1941).
96
REPORT 75.
97
REPORT 91.
98
See Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct.
206 (1938); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct.
754 (1939); National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U. S. 206,
60 S. Ct. 493 (1940); Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U. S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
II3, 60 S. Ct. 869 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn.,
310 U.S. 318, 60 S. Ct. 918 (1940); United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co.,
310 U.S. 344, 60 S. Ct. 931 (1940); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940), 3u U.S. 614, 61 S. Ct.
66 (1940), 3II U.S. 570, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1941); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 61
S. Ct. 524 (1941); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relation Board, 313 U.S.
177, 61 S. Ct. 845, (1941). See also LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 100,
142-155 (1938). Chief Justice Hughes, addressing the Federal Bar Association in
1931, said: "A host of controversies as to provisional rights are no longer decided in
courts. Administrative authority, within a constantly widening sphere of action, and
subject only to the limitations of certain broad principles, establishes particular rules,
finds the facts, and decides as to particular rights. The power of administrative bodies
to make findings of fact which may be treated as conclusive, if there is evidence both
ways, is a power of enormous consequence. An unscrupulous administrator might be
tempted to say, 'Let me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little
who lays down the general principles.' We all recognize that this development has been
to a great extent a necessary one .••• Experience, expertness and continuity of supervision, which could only be had by administrative agencies in a particular field have
come to be imperatively needed. But these new methods put us to new tests a~d the
serious question of the future is whether we have enough of the old spirit which gave
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feels that no general legislation is desirable.
"When and if the Congress is dissatisfied with the existing
review of particular types of administrative determinations, it then
may and should, by specific and purposive legislation, provide for
such change as it desires. Only by addressing itself to particular
situations, and not. by general legislation for all agency and all
types of determinations alike, can Congress make effective and
desirable change." 99
This is unsatisfactory to the minority of the committee, who believe
that the present uncertainty can be dispelled only by legislation. They
state that
"the general statutory phrases now in use, purporting to express
the congressional intent as to the scope of judicial review of administrative determinations of facts, are freely interpreted by the
courts. Wide variations in results in specific cases defy explanation. Furthermore, a fundamental change is taking place in the
concepts of the scope of judicial review hitherto derived from the
implications of due process, separation of powers, and the nature
of judicial power.... The opinion of the majority of the Supreme
Court handed down last June in Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.100 ••• forces us to the conclusion that,
in the future, fact issues involving due process, equal protection,
and doubtless also other constitutional guarantees will in all
probability no longer be subject to court review as a matter of
constitutional right. Since cases involving these issues generally
deal with important interests and often raise questions of high
emotional or political content, it follows that the present state of
uncertainty constitutes an even greater defect than heretofore,
and the importance of proper attention to judicial review of fact
determinations is very great." 101
The minority also want a legislative interpretation of the "substantial evidence" rule. Under "prevalent interpretations," they continue,
"of the 'substantial evidence' rule set forth as a measure of judicial
review in many important statutes ... if what is called 'substantial
our institutions to save them from being overwhelmed." Quoted from New York
Feb, 13, 1931, p. 18, in LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 135-136
(1938).
99
REPORT 92.
100
310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940).
101REPORT 210.
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evidence' is found anywhere in the record to support conclusions
of fact, the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision
without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence
may preponderate--unless indeed the stage of arbitrary decision
is reached. Under this interpretation, the courts need to read only
one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, the
administrative action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary is to be ignored." 102
Accordingly the minority of the committee recommend that "Until
Congress finds it practicable to examine into the situation of particular
agencies, it should provide more definitely by general legislation for
both the availability and scope of judicial review in order to reduce
uncertainty and variability." 103
S. 674, section 3II(e), as originally recommended by the minority
of the committee, provided:
"As to the findings, conclusions, and decisions in any case, the
reviewing court, regardless of the form of the review proceeding,
shall consider and decide so far as necessary to its decision and
where raised by the parties, all relevant questions of: (I) constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; ( 2) the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) the lawfulness and
adequacy of procedure; (4) findings, inferences, or conclusions
of fact unsupported, upon the whole record, by substantial evidence; and (5) administrative action otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Provided, however, That upon such review due weight
shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, specialized
knowledge, and legislative policy of the agency involved as well
as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." 104
"The formula is an ingenious one," says Mr. Dulles. "It would ...
make virtually irreviewable on the facts" a decision depending "upon
the expert opinion of the administrative agency as to the proper ultimate economic or social effect of certain conceded facts or proposed
acts," while "compelling the court to review the whole record" in cases
where "an administrative agency may be seeking to impose penalties on
102

REPORT 2 I 0-2 II.
REPORT 2II. See also McFarland, HEARINGS 1346-1350; Stason, id. 13501360; Joint Statement of Minority, id. 1372, 1400-1401, 1417. But see Shulman,
id. 838-861; Biddle, id. 1437-1438, 1452-1453, 1491-1496; Federal Trade Commission, id. 297-301.
·
104
REPORT 246-247.
108
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a private person for an alleged act or omission susceptible of objective
determination and, where the only dispute is one of fact, as to which
the prosecuting agency has already made up its mind." 105
Whether this formula can be effective is debatable. Mr. Dulles
believes it is ineffective because appellate courts are indisposed to
make a detailed study of a voluminous record.106 The committee states
the same idea somewhat differently: "The respect that courts have for
the judgments of specialized tribunals which have carefully considered the problems and the evidence cannot be legislated away." 101 The
committee thinks that the line between "substantial evidence" and
"weight of evidence" depends largely on the confidence the appellate
court has in the trial body. 108
Different considerations apply to the question of judicial review
of rules promulgated by an administrative body. Here the minority's
recommendation as embodied in S. 674, section 21 r, provides that
judicial review "shall include: (I) All matters of constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; ( 2) the statutory authority or discretion of the agency, including the propriety of interpretative rules
or the reasonableness of rules upon any formal record of hearings
where such hearings and judicial review upon the record thereof are
specially provided by statutei and (3) the observance of all procedures
required by law." 100 To meet various criticisms 110 the minority of
the committee at the close of the Hearings before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended the elimination of
the phrase "including the propriety of the interpretative rules or the
reasonableness of rules upon any formal record of hearings where
such hearings and judicial review upon the record thereof are specially
provided by statute." 111

105 Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 625, 621 (1941). See also Dulles, HEARINGS 1149-1152.
106
Dulles, HEARING, 1151-1152. See also Davison, "Administrative TechniqueThe Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REv. 628 at 641-642 (1941).
But see Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 433-439 (1941); Hart, "The Acheson
Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REv. 801 at 814, 816 (1941).
101
REPORT 91.
lOS REPORT 91.
109
REPORT 230. See also McFarland, HEARINGS 1344-1346; Joint Statement of
Minority, id. 1386-1387.
110
Biddle, HEARINGS, 1430-1431, 1470-1472.
111
HEARINGS 1386-1387, 1410.
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VI
LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS OF FAIR PROCEDURE

The minority of the committee believe that there should be legislative statements of policy, of principles, or of standards for the guidance of administrators. The courts are guided by long tradition and
a bulky Judicial Code as well as uniform rules of practice. Administrative agencies in a democracy should have similar standards. These need
not be rigid, but should make full allowance for differing needs of
different agencies.112
This is opposed by the majority of the committee on the ground
that the provisions will either be merely hortatory or that specific
requirements will be made.113 Before the latter can be done, a great
deal more study will be necessary.
The minority propose a set of standards. To the criticism that
these are "purely hortatory," 114 Mr. Dulles replies that such an expression of Congressional views and policy is bound to have a real
influence.1111
To the charge that S. 674 recommended by the minority of the
committee is "hortatory," the minority reply that S. 67 5 recommended
by the majority is "trebly so." "If S. 674," says the minority, "is to
be judged by taking out words and phrases and holding them up to
scorn because they entrust matters to the good faith of administrators,
then it is just as proper to consider words and phrases of the same type
in S. 675, which differ from those in S. 674 only in their variety." 116
112

REPORT 214, 215.
REPORT 191, 192.
lH Biddle, HEARINGS 1439. See also REPORT 191-192; Biddle, HEARINGS 14381440; Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REV.
589 at 608-609 (1941); Davison, "Administrative Technique--The Report on Administrative Procedure," id. 628 at 640 ( 194 l) ; Hart, "The Acheson Report: A
Critique," 26 lowA L. REV. 801 at 817-818 (1941).
115 Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 626 (1941). See also Dulles, HEARINGS 1148-1150.
116 HEARINGS 1374-1375. The minority of the committee cite the following
"hortatory'' phrases in S. 675 recommended by the majority of the committee (citations are to page and line of S. 675): "should be adapted" (p. 3, line 8); "should
be attended" (p. 3, line I l); "as it may prescribe" (p. 4, line I I) ; "as occasion
requires" (p. 6, line 8); "as he may deem necessary'' (p. 7, line 6); "wherever
feasible and appropriate" (p. 7, linen); "which seem ... desirable" (p. 7, line 18);
"to the fullest practicable extent'' (p. 7, line 23); "may deem appropriate" (p. 8, line
22) ; "as may be prescribed by each agency" (p. IO, line II) ; "as the agency may ...
find necessary'' (p. 12, line IO); "as may be necessary'' (p. 13, line 12) ; "in his discretion" (p. 14, line 6); "or other temporary cause" (p. 16, line 12); "so far as
feasible" "otherwise directs" (p. I 7, line l 5) ; "all measures necessary'' (p. 1 8, line 8) ;
118
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Both the majority and minority of the committee concur in recommending the creation of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure.
This would be composed of a director appointed by the President with
the advice "and consent of the Senate, a Justice of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, to be designated by its Chief Justice, and
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
who is appointed by the United States Supreme Court. Assisted by
representatives of the agencies and of the public, the Director of the
Office would study and coordinate administrative procedures, and in
gentral through continuing studies and periodical recommendations
achieve and stimulate practical improvements in a manner not possible
through omnibus legislation.117
This proposal has proved widely popular.118 Mr. Dulles calls it
the most important and most constructive proposal of the Report.
"The task of the Attorney General's Committee was so vast
that even after two years of intensive effort much still remains to
be explored. Further, the administrative process is in constant
flux. When new commissions are established or when old commissions meet new situations or assume new tasks, their procedures
are different-and should be different-from those appropriate to
the regulation of a field which has been well explored. Initially
these must be tentative, exploratory decisions in particular cases.
Later the principles of these decisions, when tested and to the
extent proved valid, may be embodied in semi-permanent rules
of general applicability. Many of the differences between the majority and •minority members of the Committee are not so much
difference in principle as difference in regard to the proper timing
of a standardization which all would agree to be ultimately salutary and practical. It is thus of vital importance that the field
should be under constant survey and study. Quite apart from substantive legislation which may result therefrom, the continuing
existence of an investigatory body will, itself, serve to stimulate
administrative agencies to self-effort toward the detection and
elimination of faulty procedures and incompetent personnel. The
"deems it appropriate" (p. 20, line 6); "as he may deem necessary" (p. 21, line 16);
"may deem proper" (p. 22, line 6) ; "found to be without merit" (p. 22, line Io) ;
"for good cause shown" (p. 23, line 3); "may limit its consideration" (p. 24, line 16);
"reasonable opportunity" (p. 24, line 22); "may by rule amplify or modify" (p.
25, line 24); "as may be necessary" (p. 26, line 24); "otherwise inexpedient" (p.
27, line 15). "These phrases," say the minority of the Committee, "are just as
hortatory as any in S. 674." HEARINGS 1375.
117 REPORT 6.
118
HEARINGS 437, 866, 1333, 1427, 1496.
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existence of an outside agency authorized to receive complaints
will do much to reassure a public which is restive because it feels
that at present it can bring its grievances only to the very party
by which it feels aggrieved. The Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure can serve so greatly to improve the working of the
administrative process that its creation would reduce to secondary
importance the other legislative proposals of the Committee." 119
History proves that Anglo-Saxons are never long attracted to
administrative perfectionism, if its procedures are inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of fair play and due process. Magna Carta
was imposed upon an administrative system that was the most perfect
in Europe when it passed from Henry II to his successors Richard
Coeur de Lion and King John.120 The procedures that eventually
made the Court of the Star Chamber a by-word, and caused its abolition in 1641,were the same procedures that under the early Tudors
made it administratively so efficient against strongly entrenched abuses
then threatening England.121 The case for the Court of Star Chamber
during that period bears a striking resemblance to the case that is today
put forward for the administrative process by some of its partisans.122
It was sound political sense to restrain these partisans from presenting
this case in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee or in the
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Throughout the Report and the Hearings spokesmen for the majority
119 Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 618-619 (1941). See also Davison, "Administrative Technique
-The Report on Administrative Procedure," id. 628 at 643; Jaffe, "The Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNIV. CH1.
L. REV. 401 at 439-440 (1941); Hart, "The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 lowA
L. REV. 801 at 807-808 (1941).
120
McKEcHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 11-47 (1914); 1 GNEisT, H1sTORY oF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., Ashworth transl., 246-271 (1889); I HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 32-58 (1922); 5 id. 174-214 (1924); MAITLAND, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 10-14 (1908); TAsWELL-LANGMEAD,
ENGLISH CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 2d ed., 88-96, 101-175 (1881).
121
BALDWIN, THE KING's CouNcIL 435-443 (1913); CARR, CoNcERNING
ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 125-126 (1941); 2 GNEIST, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CoNSTITUTION, 2d ed., Ashworth transl., 177-194 (1889); GoEBEL, CAsES AND
MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAI, INSTITUTIONS 231-240 (1931), 273284 (1937); I HALLAM, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 62-68 (1868);
1 HoLDSWOR'rH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 497-508 (1922); 5 id. 136137, 155-214 (1924); MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 218-221,
261-264 (1908); TAsWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 2d ed.,
173-174, 181-182 (1881).
122
See note 62 above.
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of the Attorney General's Committee were at pains to show their
awareness that there is today a widespread distrust of some administrative procedures, and that this distrust must be allayed.123 "In the
development of our liberty," declared Justice Brandeis, "insistence
upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. Respect for law
will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which
shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." m The same
thought has repeatedly been emphasized by Justice Frankfurter:
"safeguards [ for administrative procedure] must also be institutionalized through machinery and processes. These safeguards largely
depend on a highly professionalized civil service, an adequate technique of administrative application of legal standards, a flexible, appropriate and economical procedure ( always remembering that 'in the
development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has
been a large factor'), easy access to public scrutiny, and a constant play
of criticism by an informed and spirited bar. They are still to be
achieved, for we have hardly begun to realize deeply their need." m
"Remember, there are very precious values of civilization which ultimately, to a very great extent, are procedural in their nature." 126
"How to fit ancient liberties, which have gained a new preciousness,
into solution of those exigent and intricate economic problems that have
been too long avoided rather than faced, is the special task of Administrative Law." 121
123
REPORT 1-2, 25, 29-30, 43-46, 52-53, 55-60, 61-73, 101-121, 123-127,
251-260; Acheson, HEARINGS 805, 806, 809, 810, 815-817; Biddle, HEARINGS
1425, 1428. The American Bar Association long has been and now is a formidable

factor in the crusade for the reform of administrative procedure. See Reports of
Special Committee on Administrative Law of American Bar Association, 58 A. B. A.
REP. 407 (1933); 59 A. B. A. REP. 539 (1934); 60 A. B. A. REP. 136 (1935);
61 A. B. A. REP. 720 (1936); 62 A. B. A. REP. 789 (1937); 63 A. B. A. REP.
331 (1938); 64 A. B. A. REP. 281 (1939); 65 A. B. A. REP. 215 (1940). See also
statements in behalf of American Bar Association, HEARINGS 915-1096, 1578-1584.
Articles on administrative procedure and its reform have long been a prominent feature
in the American Bar Association Journal. See note 7 above.
12
¼ Justice Brandeis dissenting (with whom Justice Holmes concurred) in Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 at 477, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921).
125
Frankfurter, "The Task of Administrative Law," 75 UNiv. PA. L. REV.
614 at 618 (1927).
126
Frankfurter, "Summation of the Conference," 24 A. B. A. J. 282 at 286

(1938).
121

Frankfurter, "Foreword," 41 CoL. L. REV. 585 at 586 (1941).

